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RECENT CASE NOTES
One author writing upon the subject shortly after the above statute was
enacted says, "It was formerly the rule that conclusions stated in a plea
were not admitted to be true. But this rule has been changed by the
statute * * *".11 Undoubtedly it would be very desirable to have the
courts construe the statute in question so that "all conclusions" would be
admitted, without making any distinction between the kinds of conclusions.
It must have been the purpose of the statute to have all conclusions con-
sidered when necessary to the sufficiency of the complaint when ruling
upon demurrer. But it seems that a conclusion of fact is really nothing
more than an operative fact, and if so, Section 360 as construed adds
nothing to the general statute upon liberal construction which was enacted
long before section 360 was amended. C. A. R.
REAL PROPERTY-TENANCY IN COMMoN-LIFE INTEREST--JuDICIAL SALE
-PARTITIoN.-The appellants, tenants in common with appellees' decedent,
holder of a life interest, in a partition proceeding, prayed for a sale of
realty, alleging its indivisibility. Appellees' decedent, prior to her death,
admitted its indivisibilty and asked that the present value of her life
estate be determned upon the sale of the realty. On June 24, 1925 the
court ordered the realty to be sold. One piece of property was sold in
November 1925; the other, a farm, was not sold until September 1928.
Appellees' decedent filed a petition December 6, 1928, asking the court
to determine the present value of her life estate in one-third of the net
proceeds pf the sale of the realty and for an order directing the com-
missioners to pay her the amount determined. Appellees' decedent died
December 7, 1928. Appellees then filed a similar petition. Appellants
filed an answer setting out the death of the appellees' decedent and assert-
ing that her interest, even after the confirmation of the sale, was still realty
and terminated at her death. The principal question is--When realty,
held by tenants in common, is petitioned to be sold on a partition proceeding
does the conversion of the realty into personalty take place on the confirma-
tion of the sale or when the proceeds of such sale are actually distributed?
Held, that the conversion of the realty into personalty is effected on the
confirmation of the sale.1
Although it seems that the question as to the time of conversion of
realty into personalty in a partition proceeding has never been decided
in this jurisdiction before the instant case,2 yet it has been held that a
surviving second wife, without issue, is entitled, on a sale of land in such
proceeding, to one-third of the proceeds of such sale, reduced to a sum
equal to the present value of her life estate.3
An examination of the authorities reveals conflicting views, as to just
when the conversion of realty into personalty is effected on a sale in a
partition proceeding. It has been held in England and in some of our
jurisdictions that an absolute order of sale within the jurisdiction of the
1 Watson's Revlsion of Works Practice and Forms, Watson, B. F., vol. 1,
Sec. 543.1 Buschbaum v. Hale, Appellate Court of Indiana, July 27, 1932, 182 N. E. 93.
2Supra, note 1.
, wain v. Hardin (1878), 64 Ind. 85; Russell -v. Russell (1874), 48 Lad. 456;
Ooquillard v. Coquillard (1916), 62 Ind. App. 426, 113 N. D1. 481.
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court operates as a conversion from the date of the order and before any
sale has taken place.4 This view represents the extreme view and the
one most favorable to the one with a life interest and fixes the earliest
possible time of such conversion. In Foster V. Hillard,5 it was held that
each party is to participate in the proceeds of the sale in proportion to
the beneficial interest, which he had in the land at the time of the sale.
This view ii submitted as the prevailing rule in this country, although
most of the decisions are more explicit in their statement of the rule in
holding that the conversion from realty to personalty on a sale in a par-
tition proceeding is not effected until the ratification or confirmation of
the sale by the court and the compliance by the purchaser with the terms
thereof.6 There is still another view, which holds that the conversion
does not take effect until such proceeds belonging to a co-tenant, are
accepted by him as such. 7 This is the extreme view most favorable to the
holder of the remainder in fee and seems to be the most impractical.
What is the law in cases bearing a close analogy? When land is taken
under the power of eminent domain, the purchase money is generally
considered personalty and belongs to the same person to whom the land
belonged when the power of eminent domain was exercised.8 The rule
of equitable conversion also supports the view that the conversion of realty
into personalty is effected on confirmation of the sale. When a vendor
contracts to sell land the interests of the parties become fixed. The pur-
chaser becomes the equitable owner at once and the vendor holds the legal
title as security for the purchase price.9 In Moore -v. Burrows,o this
interest of the vendor was described as personal property like a bond, or
a mortgage, and that the interest went to his personal representative.
There are some decisions, which state that the proceeds derived from
the partition sale, should be treated as land and disposed of in accordance
with the respective interests, which the parties held in the land."1 Tif-
fany,12 however, interprets these statements to mean that in the distri-
bution of the proceeds of a partition sale, it is to be considered in the
light of the parties' interest in the land for the sake of succession and
distribution.
4 Hyett v. Mekin (1875), 25 Ch. 735; Greenough v. Small (1890), 137 Pa. 128,
20 At. 396; City of Owensboro v. Hardwickc (Ky.) (1930), 24 S. W. (2nd) 555.5 Federal Cases, No. 4, 972 (1840), 1 Story 77.
6Newcomer v. Orem (1852), 2 Md. 297, 56 Am. Dec. 717; Early v. Dossett
(A876),, 45 Md. 462; McLean v. Leitch (1910), 152 N. C. 266, 67 S. E. 490;
Joyner v. Futrell (1904), 136 N. C. 301, 48 S. E. 649; Albright v. Moeckley (1930)
(Iowa), 230 N. W. 351; Scott's Estate (1890), 137 Pa. 454, 20 Atl. 623.7Smith v. Bayright (1881), 34 N. J. Eq. 424; Turner v. Dawson (1885), 80 Va.
401; Wetherill v. Hough (1894), 52 N.J. Eq. 683, 29 At]. 592.
8 United State& v. Baker (1910), 183 Fed. 280; Ametrano v. Downs (1902)
(N. Y.), 62 App. Div. 405, 63 N.E. 340; Stay v. Stay (1910), 59 Wash. 651, 110
Pac. 549.
9 House v. Dexter (1861), 9 Mich. 246; Downing v. Risley (1862), 15 N. 3. Eq.
93; Williams v. Haddock (1895), 145 N. Y. 144, 39 N.E. 825; Riegelman'8 Estate
(1896), 184 Pa. 476, 34 AUt. 120; Coles v. Feeney (1899), 52 N. T. Eq. 493, 29
AUt. 172.
- (N. Y.) (1861), 34 Barb. 173.
"Garner v. 'Wood (1889), 71 Md. 37, 17 AtL 1031; Meeker v. Forbes (1915),
84 N. T. Eq. 271, 93 Ati. 887; Riley v. Riley (1921), 92 N. 3. Eq. 465, 113 A. 777;
Connole v. Con-ole (1923), 49 R. I. 1, 119 AUt. 321.
1Tiffany, Real Property, Vol. 1, No. 124, pp. 455-56.
RECENT CASE NOTES 457
There is left one question. Suppose the commissioner had effected the
sale as directed, and the purchaser had complied with the terms thereof,
all of which had been approved by the court, and then defaulted, would
the commissioner have the power to foreclose and resell the land and
treat it as personalty or would there be a reconversion back to realty?
Equity has answered this question by holding that if the purchaser defaults,
the executor or administrator may foreclose the contract and thereafter
sell the land, and administer the proceeds as a part of the vendor's personal
estate.ls J. H. H.
lZWllfams u. Haddok (1895), 145 X. Y. 144, 39 N.E. 825; Clapp v. Tower
(1903), 11 N. D. 556, 93 N. W. 862.
